Abstract: Does an expansion of the population size expose nation states to a higher risk of suffering from civil conflict? Obtaining empirical evidence for a causal relationship is difficult due to reverse effects and omitted variable bias. This paper addresses causality issues by using randomly occurring drought as an instrumental variable to generate exogenous variation in population size for a panel of 37 SubSaharan countries over the period . Instrumental variable estimates yield that a five percentage point increase in population size raises the risk of civil conflict by around six percentage points.
Introduction
At least since Malthus (1798) it has been argued that a larger population size increases a country's likelihood of suffering from civil conflict. The immense humanitarian and economic costs associated with civil conflicts are now well recognized (e.g. World Bank, 2003; Copenhagen Consensus, 2004) . Fearon and Laitin (2003) estimate that since the end of World War II civil conflicts have caused more than 16.2 million battle casualties. Many more people have been killed or disabled in civil conflict as a result of strategic violence against the civilian population and the spread of lethal diseases (Ghobarah, Huth and Russeth, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007 ).
Highly concerning is also evidence by Bellow and Miguel (2006) that shows that the negative impact of civil conflict on economic development may have long-run effects, translating into permanently lower levels of per capita GDP. The Malthusian claim thus bears substantial implications for public policy and theories of economic development as it raises concern that population increases may not only have a potentially negative effect on per capita income levels but also on aggregate output and social and political stability.
Obtaining a clean estimate on the impact that population size exhibits on civil conflict risk is not an easy task. The majority of empirical studies investigating the link between population size and civil conflict has relied on the analysis of panel data, exploiting both cross-country as well as within country time series variation (Gleditsch and Urdal, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Urdal, 2005; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) . It is questionable though to what 1 extend this research has achieved testing for a causal relationship as the employed econometric framework does not address large biases that arise from reverse causality and omitted variables (e.g. Blattman and Miguel, 2008) . The mass killing associated with civil conflicts and the waves of migration streams that often set in even before warfare activity has fully escalated make (past) population size a highly endogenous regressor to the presence of civil conflict (Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007; UNHCR, 2007) . Many difficult to measure variables proxying for social fragmentation, institutional quality, and economic conditions further complicate inference, pushing total biases in arbitrary directions. This paper digs into the question of a causal effect going from larger population size to a higher probability of civil conflict by constructing instrumental variable estimates for a panel of 37 Sub-Saharan countries over the period . Sub-Saharan Africa has been, and continues to be (e.g. World Bank, 2003) , one of the world's top concerns in terms of intra-state instability as more than two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan countries have suffered from a civil conflict in the past 25 years. To generate for these countries variations in population size I use randomly occurring drought as an instrumental variable. The negative response of the Sub-Saharan population to drought provides a unique opportunity to obtain an exogenous source of variation in population size both for the cross-section of Sub-Saharan countries as well as within countries across time. I show that once instrumented population size has an economically meaningful and statistically significant effect on African civil conflict.
The foundation for my instrumental variable analysis is that Sub-Saharan economies depend heavily on a poorly irrigated agricultural sector with crop yield highly vulnerable to rainfall (e.g., IPCC, 2001; WDI, 2007) . A combination of government subsidies and unemployment insurances cushion the adverse effects of drought in economically developed countries but these buffer mechanisms are either widely lacking in Sub-Saharan countries, or if present highly ineffective (Sen, 1981; Fafchamps, 2003) . The impact of drought on poor, credit-constrained, African households is thus much more dramatic. So much so, that famines caused by extremely harsh and repeated drought go hand in hand with a reduction in birth rates, widespread migration, and higher mortality rates (WHO, 2006; UNHCR, 2007) .
A first stage regression supports this identification strategy: Sub-Saharan population size decreased in response to drought by an average of 1.6 percentage points, significant at the 1% level.
In the second stage I exploit this relationship to construct instrumental variable estimates linking exogenously driven variations in country population size to civil conflict. I find that a five percentage point increase in the population of Sub-Saharan countries raises civil conflict incidence by over six percentage points and increases the risk of a new or recurrent civil conflict onset by over three percentage points. Instrumental variable estimates therefore point towards population size having a quantitatively large effect on civil conflict risk in Sub-Saharan Africa.
An important part to my instrumental variable analysis is that I estimate the impact that population size exhibits on civil conflict likelihood conditional on per capita GDP.
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To account for the endogeneity of per capita income to both population size and civil conflict I use smooth variations in rainfall and international commodity prices as additional instrumental variables (e.g. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004; and Brückner and Ciccone, 2007) . More rainfall and higher prices for exported commodities significantly increase real per capita income of African countries but have no significant effect on population size. In the second stage I find that, conditional on population size, a one percentage point increase in per capita income significantly reduces civil conflict incidence by around two percentage points.
My empirical analysis also takes into account unobservables related to both civil conflict and population size. Country fixed effects are implemented to capture difficult to measure crosscountry heterogeneity such as differences in institutional quality, ethnic and religious fragmentation, or time-invariant geographic conditions, such as mountainous terrain. Additional heterogeneity arising from trends in population size or global climate change is addressed by considering the use of country specific time trends and year fixed effects. The paper's findings may be specific to the Sub-Saharan region, but this does not prevent them from shedding new and relevant empirical insights on a theoretical debate of general interest related to an optimal design of the size of nations (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997 , 2006 . The adverse effects of civil conflict on economic development and social stability are a strong channel through which smaller country size could yield substantial improvements to human welfare. The strength of this paper is that by using an instrumental variable approach it takes a step forward to make it credible that the link between population size and civil conflict is of causal nature. In contrast, an analysis based on simple correlations can not shed insight on this debate as it is silent about the direction of causality.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the related literature, Section 3 discusses the estimation methodology, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 concludes.
The Population-Conflict Nexus: Some Theory and Evidence
The hypothesis that a larger population size can act as a destabilizing force to poor countries' political and social order can be traced back to at least Thomas Robert Malthus (1798) who argued that population increases lead to a reduction in per capita output of agricultural goods due to a fixed supply of (fertile) land. Malthus (1798, pg. 22) claimed that in the midst of population induced resource scarcity a "struggle for existence" arises with "young scions [being] pushed out from the parent-stock to gain happier seats for themselves by their swords". Malthus's thoughts ignited a fierce debate in the circles of policy makers concerning the necessity of population control and the benefits derived from government lead poverty relief programs (Hart, 1992) . They had also a substantial impact on a broad spectrum of scientists ranging from evolutionary biologists such as Charles Darwin to economists like John Meynard Keynes. It was not however until the end of the 20th century that a systematic effort was made to study the connection between population and organized forms of intra-state violence in an empirically rigorous manner.
Exceptionally rich case study evidence was provided by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994 , 1999 , linking population expansions in the presence of resource scarcity to civil strife in the Eastern Islands, the Senegal river valley, southern parts of the Philippines, or the Assam region in India. The most striking of these example is the 1994 Rwandan genocide where over half a million Tutsi were slaughtered by Hutu militias. Although a popular explanation of the civil war has been ethnic hatred between two very polarized groups, Homer-Dixon points out that Rwanda was at the time of the conflict one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Moreover, fertile land was in extremely short supply due to a consistent degradation of the environment, making food an extremely scarce good. Interviews of Rwandan war casualties collected by Andre and Platteau (1998) echo the argument that overpopulation and scarcity played a major role in causing the Rwandan genocide. Andre and Platteau report: "The 1994 events provided a unique opportunity to settle scores, or to reshuffle land properties, even among Hutu villagers....It is not rare, even today, to hear Rwandans argue that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of population and to bring numbers into line with the available land resources." 3 Although these case studies revealed important and detailed insights on the mechanism of population pressure induced conflict, they were heavily criticized for suffering from selectivity bias and lack of generality (Gleditsch, 2001; Urdal, 2005) . Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) therefore used panel data to address these shortcomings. They found robust evidence pointing towards countries with larger population size to be exposed to a higher risk of intra-state war. Other empirical panel-data studies followed, finding similarly adverse effects of population size on civil conflict (e.g. Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) . The important point that Blattman and 3 Quoted from Diamond (2005, Ch. 10) 5 Miguel (2008) emphasize in their review of the conflict literature is however that there is no reason to belief in a causal relationship between civil conflict and country population size because studies
have not yet addressed expectedly large biases that arise from omitted variables and the endogenous response of population size to civil conflict.
Estimation Methodology
The econometric framework employed in this paper to overcome these problems follows a twostage instrumental variable approach that treats both population size and per capita GDP as endogenous variables to the incidence and onset of civil conflict. In a first stage regression country population size and per capita GDP are regressed on a set of instruments and control variables.
Equations (1a) and (1b) show formally the functional specification,
where POP stands for country population size, GDP is the level of (real) per capita GDP, Drought is a dummy variable indicating episodes of drought, Rain is the amount of rainfall observed in a given country-year, and Index is an index of international prices for exported commodity goods (see Section 3 for a description of these variables). The control variables are: (i) country fixed effects α c , (ii) country specific time trends β c *t, and (iii) year fixed effects γ t . The first sub-index "1" refers to equation number "1", the second sub-index identifies the coefficient on the regressor; log stands for the natural logarithm. The errors terms are clustered at the country level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation within countries across time.
The second stage estimates the impact that variations in population size and per capita GDP exhibit on civil conflict. Formally, it is represented by equation (2),
where Conflict is an indicator function that is one in the event of civil conflict and zero else. Note, 6 that despite the presence of a binary dependent variable equation (2) is specified as a linear probability model as this is in two-stage instrumental variable estimation the usually preferred method (Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Wooldridge, 2003) . force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle deaths." According to UCDP/PRIO, a conflict over government is an "incompatibility concerning the type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition;" a conflict over territory is an "incompatibility concerning the status of the specified territory, e.g. secession or autonomy." Roughly speaking, for every 2 civil conflict outbreaks over territorial autonomy, there were about 3.5 civil conflict outbreaks over government.
For detailed summary statistics see Table 1 , Panel A.
Data on population size and real per capita GDP is taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006) . More specific measures of population size --working age population (ages 15-64), youth bulges (ages 0-14), and male population --come from the World Development Indicators (2007). The summary statistics for these variables (in log points) can be found in Table   1 , Panel B.
Following Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) observations on rainfall for the SubSaharan region come from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology Project, Version 2 (Adler et al, 2003) . Based on this data, droughts are identified by an indicator function that is one for the 5% largest negative drops in the level of rainfall over two consecutive years. Drawing on data provided by the Universite Catholique de Louvain's EM-DAT (2008) natural disaster database, Appendix Table 1 shows that these rainfall identified droughts affected in nearly all cases at least hundreds of thousands of people, and in many instances the numbers were even in the millions.
The index of international commodity prices is taken from Brückner and Ciccone (2007) who construct this measure for 19 commodities using fixed export shares. The fixed export shares ensure that the instrument's time-series variation stems entirely from fluctuations contained in international commodity prices, which are plausibly exogenous to the incidence of African civil conflict. For summary statistics on rainfall, drought, and the commodity price index see Table 1 , Panel C.
Empirical Results

Drought, Population Size, and Per Capita GDP
The first stage estimates are reported in Table 2 where the control variables are country fixed effects, country specific time trends, and common year fixed effects (all jointly significant at the 1 percent level). Column (1) shows that drought lead to an average decrease in population size by over 1.6 percentage points, significant at the 1 percent level. Minor changes in the level of rainfall, as captured by the linear rainfall term, had no significant effect. The international commodity price index is also insignificant.
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Columns (2) and (3) investigate whether this relationship is maintained when restricting attention to working age population or youth bulges. This yields virtually the same point estimates as in column (1) with the drought dummy being highly significantly negative.
Column (4) shows that drought had also an equally significantly negative effect on male population.
In column (5) I examine whether one of the reasons why country population size decreased in response to drought was because drought increased the incentives for migration to other countries (e.g. Sen, 1981; Fafchamps, 2003) . Drawing on annual data made publicly available by the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) from 1991 onwards, I find that this was indeed the case --drought increased the number of refugees in the country of origin by over 80 percent, significant at over 96 percent confidence. Smooth variations in rainfall and international commodity prices are on the other hand insignificant.
In column (6) I report first stage estimates for per capita GDP. Similar to Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) , I find a positive effect of rainfall on income: a ten percentage point increase in the amount of rainfall is associated with an average increase in per capita GDP by 0.75 percentage points, significant at the 1 percent level. Also, windfalls from commodity prices were a blessing for Sub-Saharan countries: a ten percentage point increase in the international price for exported commodities increased per capita GDP by over 0.85 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level. Note that drought in the first stage per capita GDP regression is insignificant.
Columns (7) and (8) show however that drought did have a significantly negative effect on total GDP. Table 3 presents estimates on the effect that population size exhibits on civil conflict incidence. In columns (1) and (2) I regress the civil conflict incidence indicator on a set of cross-sectional control variables, the log of population size, and the log of (real) per capita GDP.
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The probit model of column (1) is estimated using maximum likelihood and reported coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at sample means. It turns out that the only variable significant at conventional confidence levels is the log share of mountainous terrain. Population size and per capita GDP are both insignificant. Also cross-sectional differences in ethnic fractionalization, colonial origin, and political decentralization are not significantly associated with a higher or lower average incidence of civil conflict. In column (2) exactly the same set of variables are included but the functional form is changed to a linear probability model. Comparing these point estimates with the marginal effects of column (1) shows that the least squares and probit estimates yield coefficients that are both quantitatively and statistically quite similar. Moreover, the only variable significant is a country's share of mountainous terrain.
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) need to be interpreted with care since there remain many difficult to measure variables related to cross-sectional differences in social fragmentation, institutional quality, or geographic conditions that have only been captured imperfectly by the set of included control variables. Column (3) therefore implements country fixed effects to account for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. This has the implication that point estimates increase somewhat in absolute size. Yet, statistically they remain insignificant at conventional confidence levels.
Column (4) estimates the effect that variations in population size have on civil conflict incidence by two-stage least squares (2SLS). Using the drought dummy, rainfall, and the international commodity price index as excluded instruments an IV estimate yields a highly significant coefficient on the population variable that is nearly ten times larger than the corresponding least squares estimate of column (3): a one percentage point increase in population size increases the likelihood of civil conflict by over 1.2 percentage points (p-value 0.043). Per capita GDP enters this second stage with the correct sign but is only significant at the 10 percent level. In column (5) I include country trends and common year effects as additional control variables. This bears the result that the coefficient on country population size becomes even larger and that per capita GDP enters as highly significantly negative (p-value 0.004): a positive shock to per capita GDP by one percentage point reduces civil conflict incidence by over 1.9 percentage points.
Column (6) shows that the negative relationship between per capita GDP and civil conflict is maintained when elevating the benchmark for coding an event as civil conflict to 1000 battle deaths per annum (civil war). But this is not true for country population size. In this case the estimated coefficient on the population variable is insignificant, though quantitatively it remains quite large.
Civil Conflict Onset.
Because civil conflict incidence incorporates elements of conflict duration, one possible interpretation of the results in Table 3 is that larger country population size and lower per capita GDP increase the likelihood of an already ongoing civil conflict. Equally plausible, and from the policy perspective more interesting, is that increases in country population size increase the likelihood of an outbreak of new or recurrent civil conflict.
To explore this channel, Table 4 presents estimates where the dependent variable is a civil conflict onset indicator that takes on the value of one each time there is an outbreak of civil conflict.
The first column reports the least squares estimates. Just as in Table 3 these estimates are quantitatively small and statistically insignificant. In column (2) population size and per capita GDP are instrumented by drought, smooth variations in rainfall, and the index of international commodity prices. Now the effect of population size is quantitatively larger and statistically
significant. An instrumental variable estimate yields that a five percentage point increase in population size raises the likelihood of a civil conflict outbreak by over three percentage points.
Higher per capita GDP in turn significantly reduces this probability. In column (3) I include in addition to the country fixed effects country specific time trends and year fixed effects. This raises the coefficient on both the population variable and per capita GDP. A Hausman test rejects equality of the IV and least-squares estimate at the 1 percent level, pointing towards large biases that arise in the least squares regression.
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In columns (4)-(6) I repeat the analysis for civil war onset and find similarly large effects of population size and per capita income on civil war risk once instrumental variable techniques are applied.
Robustness
Overidentification Tests
Underlying the validity of the instrumental variable estimates is of course the all important exclusion restriction that drought, rainfall, and the international commodity price index have no effect on civil conflict other than through per capita income or population size. To examine more intuitively instrument validity, Table 5 adds one-by-one the drought dummy, the linear rainfall measure, and the index of international commodity prices as exogenous regressors. The reduced form estimates in columns (1) and (5) yield that drought, conditional on rainfall and the international commodity price index, has a significantly negative effect on civil conflict. If this is because of channels other than per capita income or population size, then one expects that drought enters as significantly negative in the second stage regression where population 8 As discussed in the introduction, a least squares estimate is likely to suffer from large downward bias for two main reasons. First, the outbreak of civil conflict is often associated with waves of mass migration, which reduces the population size in the country of origin substantially. Second, measurement error in Sub-Saharan account statistics is quite large (Heston, 1994; Deaton, 2005) . To the extend that the measurement error is classical least squares estimates will be attenuated towards zero, producing insignificant coefficients. 9 For instance, one may imagine that drought affects civil conflict through stimulating an influx of food aid, increasing income inequality, or that international commodity prices have a disproportional effect on government income. Note that if this were the case then the second stage estimates are a lower bound, given that one beliefs that more inequality or a larger government size increase the likelihood of civil conflict. This is because the reduced form estimates in Table 5 indicate that drought, beyond its income effect, reduces the risk of a civil conflict outbreak.
size and per capita GDP are treated as endogenous regressors. Columns (2) and (6) show that this is not the case --the coefficient on drought is positive, quantitatively small, and statistically insignificant. The estimates in columns (2) and (6) therefore provide supportive evidence for the assumption that drought only affects civil conflict through income or population size, and that otherwise, its effect on civil conflict is quantitatively small and insignificant.
Columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8) repeat this exercise for the linear rainfall measure and the international commodity price index. As can be readily seen, there is no evidence that these instruments affect civil conflict through channels other than per capita GDP or population size. Table 5 therefore echoes the results of the Hansen J-test that showed that instruments are uncorrelated to second stage error terms.
Fuller Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Also essential for the instrumental variable regressions to yield consistent estimates is that instruments provide a sufficiently precise first stage fit. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested as a rule of thumb criteria a first stage F-stat of around 10, which for the population (per capita GDP) regression was 10.79 (8.75). The Cragg-Donald statistic is however substantially lower (3.55),
indicating that instruments may be weak (see Stock, Watson, and Yogo (2002) ). To address this I present second stage estimates using Fuller limited information maximum-likelihood estimators.
These estimators have been shown to be more robust to weak instruments than two-stage least squares (e.g. Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Hahn and Hausman, 2003) . The two Fuller limitedinformation maximum likelihood estimates are calculated for Fuller constants 4 and 1. The Fuller 1 estimator yields the most unbiased estimator and is recommended when one wants to test hypotheses; the Fuller 4 estimator minimizes the mean squared error of the estimator (Fuller, 1977) . Table 6 shows that using either of these Fuller estimators produces estimates that are quite similar to the 2SLS estimates of Table 3 and 4. In all cases is the effect of population size and per capita 13 GDP quantitatively large and statistically significant.
Alternative Drought Data
As an additional robustness check I present in Table 7 instrumental variable estimates based on the use of alternative drought indicators. In columns (1) and (2) second stage estimates are computed for extending the drought dummy to include also those instances where rainfall was in the lower 5%-10% quantile. This produces significant second stage estimates for both population size as well as per capita GDP that are quantitatively and statistically quite similar to the previous estimates.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that extending the cut-off much beyond the 5 percent quantile, say, to the 15 percent quantile, does not yield significant first nor second stage point estimates (regressions not shown). This should not surprise given that it are severe and repeated droughts, rather than episodes of low rainfall, that lead to widespread famine in Sub-Saharan Africa.
An alternative to the rainfall based drought indicator is to use data on drought provided by the Universite Catholique de Louvain's International Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT, 2008).
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In this database a drought is reported if any of the following minimum criteria are fulfilled:
(i) ten or more people reported killed; (ii) hundred or more people affected; (iii) a declaration of a state of emergency; or (iv) a call for international assistance. Columns (3) and (4) compute the second stage estimates that use instead of the rainfall based drought dummy the EM-DAT drought indicator as an instrumental variable. I define the EM-DAT indicator in complete analogy to the rainfall based drought indicator, assigning it a value of one for the 5 percent harshest droughts (measured by number of people affected according to EM-DAT). Column (3) shows that using the EM-DAT drought indicator as an instrument yields a significant second stage estimate on both the population and the per capita GDP variable. In column (4) the estimate on the population variable turns insignificant however when including year fixed effects and country specific time trends. As a further robustness check, I therefore combine EM-DAT drought data with the GPCP rainfall 10 The data is publicly available at www.emdat.be.
14 based drought indicator, generating a dummy variable that is one if both EM-DAT and GPCP jointly agree on the event of drought. This yields point estimates that are quantitatively as well as statistically quite similar to those obtained in the baseline estimates of Table 3 .
It should be pointed out that for purposes of instrumental variable analysis the rainfall based drought indicator has at least three important advantages over the EM-DAT data. First, rainfall based drought is interpretable as triggering famine, which in Sub-Saharan Africa reduces population size because of lower fertility, migration, and higher mortality rates. Second, since rainfall is random the drought indicator is completely exogenous to the presence of Sub-Saharan civil conflict.
This stands in stark contrast to the EM-DAT drought indicator, which is an outcome variable potentially endogenous to the conditions of the local environment. Moreover, generating a drought indicator based on number of people affected may produce confounding effects because of crosscountry differences in the size and the trend of the population variable. A rainfall based drought indicator is therefore preferable from the standpoint of instrumental variable analysis.
Conclusion
Testing the link between country population size and civil conflict risk requires an exogenous source of variation in population size. I argued that drought induced variations in the population of Sub-Saharan countries satisfy this condition. By exploiting the negative response of the SubSaharan population to randomly occurring drought and constructing instrumental variable estimates that linked exogenously driven variation in population size to civil conflict risk, I addressed issues at the heart of identifying causal effects that arise in the presence of endogeneity bias and omitted variables. I showed that failure to address these biases may lead to the conclusion that population size had no significant effect on civil conflict risk.
Two main messages follow from the paper's empirical results: first, larger population size places African states at a significantly higher risk of suffering from civil conflict --smaller population size leads to more stability --and second, as nations become richer they will have less armed conflict. Keeping Africa's population growth in check will hence have pay-offs that extend beyond per capita income channels: it reduces the risk of political collapse and mass intra-state violence. Should Sub-Saharan countries nevertheless continue to experience rapid increases in their population size, then it is at least assuring to know that higher per capita income can act as a countervailing force, significantly reducing the incidence of civil conflict that has killed and maimed millions of people in Sub-Saharan Africa. Note: Method of estimation in column (1) is maximum likelihood, with marginal effects evaluated at sample means; columns (2)-(3) least squares, and columns (4)-(6) two-stage least squares. The excluded instruments in columns (4)-(6) are the drought indicator, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index. The Hansen J-test statistic on the overidentification restrictions is provided in form of p-values. The t-values shown in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Note: Method of estimation in columns (1) and (4) is least squares, columns (2)- (3) and (5)- (6) two-stage least squares. The excluded instruments in columns (2)- (3) and (5)- (6) are the drought indicator, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index. The Hansen J-test statistic on the overidentification restrictions is provided in form of p-values. The t-values shown in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Note: Method of estimation in columns (1) and (5) is least squares; columns (2)- (4) and (5)- (6) two-stage least squares. The instruments are the drought indicator, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index. The t-values shown in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. Note: Method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The excluded instruments are a drought indicator variable, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index. The t-values shown in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
